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Abstract
We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the “outside” (that do not
compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost
advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” firms, by accepting
such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to
ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.
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Introduction

One of the principal concerns of any firm is to configure the supply of intermediate goods
essential to its production. Of late, with the liberalization of trade and the lowering of barriers to entry, supply chain configurations have assumed global proportions. Indeed, in several
industries, it has become the trend for firms to cut across national boundaries and outsource
their supplies “offshore”, provided the economic lure is strong enough. Many diverse factors influence firms’ decisions. First, of course, there is the immediate cost of procuring the
goods which—other things being equal—firms invariably seek to minimize. Then there is
the question of risk: a firm may be unwilling to commit itself to a single party and instead
spread its orders among others, even if they happen to be costlier, in order to ensure a steady
flow of inputs. Sometimes a firm may tie up with a broad spectrum of suppliers so as to
increase its access to the latest technological innovation, which could be forthcoming from
any one of them. There can arise situations when a firm is impelled to select suppliers that
will be strategic allies in its endeavor to penetrate newly emerging markets. For the analyses
of these and other factors, and how they impinge on firms’ decisions, see, e.g., Jarillo (1993),
Spiegel (1993), Vidal and Goetschalkx (1997), Domberger (1998), Aggarwal (2003), Shy
and Stenbacka (2003), Chen et al. (2004).
One intriguing possibility that has been alluded to, but not much explored, is that strategic incentives may arise in an oligopoly which outweigh other considerations and play the
pivotal role in firms’ selection of suppliers. Instances of this are presented by Jarillo and
Domberger, of which we recount only two.
The first case comes from Germany. AEG1 used to be a traditional supplier to both
BMW2 and Mercedes Benz. At some point, with a view to vertical integration, Mercedes
Benz acquired AEG. This caused BMW to look for a different supplier, despite the inevitable
extra costs of the switch (see p. 67, Jarillo, 1993).
The second case involves General Electric (GE) in the United States. In the early 1980’s,
GE investigated the possibility of outsourcing its lower brand microwave ovens from outside, since these had become too costly to manufacture at its factory in Maryland. Discussions were first held with, and even trial orders given to, Matsushita which happened to
be a major rival of GE and also the world leader for this product in terms of both volume
and technology. But ultimately GE turned to Samsung, then a small company with little
experience in microwaves. The strategy entailed additional costs, such as sending American
engineers to Korea, but it worked well for GE (see, pp. 84-86, Jarillo, 1993; and also Case
Study 6.2, p. 108, Domberger, 1998).
Such case studies clearly point to the need for a game-theoretic analysis. In this paper
we bring to light a scenario in which the outsourcing patterns emerge out of the strategic
competition between firms. We find that it is typically not the case that a firm will outsource
supplies to its rivals. There are two distinct reasons for this. The first is based on increasing
returns to scale: if a firm places a sizeable order with its rival, it significantly lowers the
rival’s costs on account of the increasing returns, and this stands to its detriment in the
ensuing competition on the final product. Thus the firm is led to outsource to others who
1
2

Allgemeine Deutsche Electricitätsgesellschaft
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may be costlier but, being out of the final product market, do not pose the threat of future
competition. The second reason is more subtle and persists even in the case of constant
returns to scale (i.e., linear costs)—indeed, it comes to the fore in this case. It is the main
focus of this paper.
To be precise, suppose there are many firms N competing in the market for a final
product α. Intermediate goods η are critical to the production of α, but only some of the
firms I ⊂ N have the competence to manufacture η at reasonable cost. The other firms
J ≡ N \I must obtain η from elsewhere. One possibility is to outsource η to their rivals
in I. But there is also a fringe of firms O on the “outside” which can manufacture η. What
distinguishes O from I is that no firm in O can enter the market for the final product α.
(This could be because it lacks the technology to convert η to α, or else faces high set-up
costs—and, possibly, other barriers to entry—in the market α.3 ) To keep matters simple, we
consider a purely linear model, i.e., in which the costs of production for both η and α are
linear; as is the market demand for α.
Our main result is that, in this scenario, strategic considerations can come into play that
will cause the firms in J to outsource η (outside) to O rather than (inside) to I, even if the
costs of manufacturing η are higher in O than in I, so long as they are not much higher.
The intuition goes roughly as follows and is best seen with just three firms. Suppose (i)
I and J are Cournot duopolists which compete in the market for the final product α; (ii)
I and O can produce the intermediate good η, but J cannot; and (iii) O cannot enter the
market for α. Thus J is confronted with the decision of how much η to outsource to I and
how much to O, all of which it will convert to α. It turns out that the optimal course of
action for J is to outsource exclusively to either I or O, never to both. Now if J outsources
to I, then I immediately knows the amount outsourced. This has the effect of establishing
J as leader in the Stackelberg game that ensues in the market for α, in which I is forced to
become the follower. In contrast, if J outsources to O then—thanks to the sanctity of the
secrecy clause4 —I will only know that J has struck a deal with O but not the quantity that
J has ousourced. Thus I and J will remain Cournot duopolists in the ensuing game on
market α.
If costs for manufacturing η do not vary too much between I and O, then I will earn less
as a Stackelberg follower than as a Cournot duopolist. This will tempt I to push J towards
O by quoting so high a price for the intermediate good η that, in spite of the premium that J
is willing to pay for the privilege of being the leader, J prefers to go to O. The temptation
can only be resisted if it is feasible for I to provide η at such an exorbitant price that it can
recoup as provider what it loses as follower. But such an exorbitant price can be undercut
by O, as long as O’s costs are not too much higher than I’s. The upshot is that in any
3

In particular, think of the following set-up. The market for α is concentrated in the “developed world”.
The firms in O, on the other hand, are located offshore in the “developing world” and can manufacture η but
lack the (advanced) technology for converting η to α. Even if some of them were to make the technological
breakthrough, they would face not just the standard set-up costs for penetrating the market α, but further barriers
to entry that pertain to foreign firms. This international setting perhaps makes our hypothesis of an outside fringe
O more viable. But we do not need it, and all we formally postulate is the existence of this fringe.
4
The secrecy clause is crucial to our analysis. It can be upheld on the simple ground that it is routinely seen
in practice (see, e.g., Ravenhill, 2003; Clarkslegal and Kochhar, 2005). But, as we argue in Section 6, there are
a variety of settings in which it can be shown to hold endogenously in equilibrium.
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subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium5 (SPNE) of the game, J will outsource to O.
To complete the intuitive argument, we must still show that J ’s outsourcing orders will
be exclusive. If J intends to produce no more than its Cournot quantity of α, then its rival
I’s output of α is invariant of who J outsources η to, and so J would do best to outsource
η from whichever of I or O is charging the lower price. On the other hand, if J intends to
produce more than its Cournot quantity, then it is best for J to fully take advantage of its
leadership and outsource the Stackelberg amount to I.
The actual argument is more intricate and the exact result is presented in Section 3. As
was said, there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for the outside firm O. In fact,
we suppose that O has a higher cost than I for manufacturing η. Our main result states that,
if O’s cost does not exceed a well-defined threshold, J will outsource to O in any SPNE.
Worthy of note is the fact that it is not J who has the “primary” strategic incentive to
outsource to O. This incentive resides with I who is anxious to ward off J and force J to
turn to O. The anxiety gets played out when O does not have a severe cost disadvantage
compared to I. Otherwise, I is happy to strike a deal with J since it can get high provider
prices that compensate it for becoming a follower. Which subgame gets played between I
and J on market α—Cournot or Stackelberg—is thus not apriori fixed, but endogenous to
equilibrium. This is all the more striking since, in our overall game, the option is open for
firm J to outsource to both I and O and to thus bring any “mixture” of the Stackelberg and
Cournot games into play. The logic of the SPNE rules out mixing and shows that only one
of the two pure games will occur along the equilibrium play.
It should also be mentioned that our game involves simultaneous moves at various junctures, first at the very start, when firms I and O independently quote prices at which they
are willing to supply η, and later in those subgames which follow after J ’s decision to outsource positive amounts of η to O. Thus we are far from having perfect information in our
game, and it is not a priori clear that SPNE will even exist in pure strategies. We prove that,
in fact, there is a continuum of pure strategy SPNE, across which the outputs of the firms
differ, but the outsourcing pattern is nevertheless invariant.
Economies of scale can easily be incorporated into our model. But then, as was said,
a new strategic consideration arises, though it does not affect the tenor of our results (see
Section 5.1 and, for full details, Chen & Dubey, 2005). The primary strategic incentive to
outsource to O can shift from I to J . For now J must worry that if it outsources η to I,
then I will develop a cost advantage on account of economies of scale. In other words,
I will be able to manufacture η for itself at an average cost that is significantly lower than
what it charges to J . This might outweigh any leadership advantage that J obtains by going
to I. So, foreseeing a competitor in I that is fierce inspite of being a follower, J would
prefer to outsource to O as long as O’s price is not too much above I’s. This, in turn, will
happen if O’s costs are not significantly higher than I’s. But then, if J is outsourcing to O,
economies of scale can drive I to outsource to O as well!
These two strategic considerations, the first impelling I to push J towards O and the
second impelling J to turn away from I on its own and to seek out O, are intermingled in
the presence of economies of scale. It is hard to disentangle them and say precisely when one
5
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fades out, leaving spotlight on the other. But by eliminating economies of scale altogether,
we are here able to focus on just the first scenario, wherein the game turns essentially on the
informational content of the strategies.
Our analysis indicates that firms which position themselves on the “outside”, by not
entering the market for the final product, are more likely to attract orders for intermediate
goods. There is some evidence that this can happen in practice. By the mid-1980’s (see
Ravenhill, 2003), US companies in the electronics industry were looking “to diversify their
sources of supply” in order to fare better against their Japanese competitors. Malaysia and
Singapore made a strong bid to get the US business. A key feature of the government policies
of both nations was that “they were not attempting to promote national champions in the
electronic industry”, but the objective was rather “to build a complementary supply base,
not to create local rivals that might displace foreign producers”. Their success in becoming
major supply hubs for electronic components is well documented. Of course it is true that
they had the advantage of low-cost skilled labor. But what we wish to underscore is their
deliberate and well-publicized abstention from markets for the final products. According
to our analysis, the abstention by itself gave Malaysia and Singapore a competitive edge:
even if their costs were to rise and exceed those in Japan, US firms would still favor them as
suppliers, since the Japanese firms are entrenched rivals on the final product.
In conclusion, let us mention that there is considerable literature on endogenous Stackelberg leadership.6 The paper most closely related to ours,7 and inviting immediate comparison, is Baake, Oechssler and Schenk (1999). They consider a duopoly model to examine
what they call “cross-supplies” within an industry—in our parlance, this is the phenomenon
that a firm outsources to its rival. The “endogenous Stackelberg effect” is indeed pointed out
by them: firm A, upon accepting the order outsourced by its rival B, automatically becomes
a Stackelberg follower in the ensuing game on the final markets. But there are set-up costs
of production in their model, and provided these costs are high enough, A can charge B
a sufficiently high price so as to be compensated for being a follower. The upshot is that
cross-supplies can be sustained in SPNE.
There are several points of difference between their model and ours. First, their argument relies crucially on the presence of sufficiently strong economies of scale (set-up costs).
If these are absent or weak, there is no outsourcing in SPNE in their model. In contrast,
in our model, outsourcing occurs purely on account of the endogenous Stackelberg effect
(recall that we have constant returns to scale8 ). Second, outsourcing occurs only in some
of their SPNE: there always coexist other SPNE where it does not occur. In our model, the
outsourcing is invariant across all SPNE. In short, they show that outsourcing can occur,
while we show that it must. Third, it is critical for their result that there be no outside suppliers.9 Such suppliers would generate competition that would make it infeasible for A to
charge a high price to B, invalidating their result. In our model, the situation is different.
We allow for both kinds of suppliers: those that are inside as potential rivals and others that
6
E.g., Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), Mailath (1993), Pal (1993), van Damme and Hurkens
(1999)—in all of which the timing of entry by firms is viewed as strategic.
7
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing it to our attention
8
Though, as was said, outsourcing is further boosted by economies of scale in our model.
9
Recall that these are suppliers who are not present as rivals in the final product market.
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are outside. It turns out that increasing the number of either type leaves our result intact (see
Section 5). Finally—and this, to our mind, is the most salient difference—the economic
phenomena depicted in Baake et al. and here are different, indeed almost complementary.
In Baake et al., the issue is to figure out when a firm will outsource to its rival. Here we
consider precisely the opposite scenario and pinpoint conditions under which a firm will
turn away from its rival and outsource instead to an outsider, even if the outsider happens to
have a costlier technology.10 The fact that both models take cognizance of the endogenous
Stackelberg effect is a technical—albeit interesting—point. What is significant is that this
effect is embedded in disparate models and utilized to explain complementary economic
phenomena.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2, stripped down to
its bare minimum, and with just three firms. The main result is stated in Section 3 and its
proof is in Section 4. In Section 5, we indicate how our result is robust to various extensions
of the model. Finally, in Section 6 we give an intuitive justification for the presence of the
secrecy clause in the contract between firm J and firm O.

2

The Model

For ease of notation, we substitute 0, 1, 2 for O, I, J . As was said, firms 1 and 2 are
duopolists in the market for a final good α. An intermediate good η is required to produce
α. Firm 1 can manufacture η, but 2 cannot. There is an “outside” firm 0 which can also
manufacture η. What distinguishes 0 from 1 is that 0 cannot enter the market for the final
good α. Firm 0’s sole means of profit is the manufacture of good η for the “inside” firms 1
and 2.
The inverse market demand for good α is given by P = max{0, a − Q}, where Q
denotes the total quantity of α produced by firms 1 and 2, and P denotes the price of α. The
constant marginal cost of production of good η is c0 for 0 and c1 for 1. Furthermore both
1 and 2 can convert x units of good η into x units of good α at the (for simplicity) same
constant marginal cost, which w.l.o.g we normalize to zero. We assume
0 < c1 < c0 < (a + c1 )/2

(1)

The condition c1 < c0 gives a cost disadvantage to the outside firm 0 and loads the dice
against good η being sourced to it. The inequality c0 < (a + c1 )/2 prevents 1 from automatically becoming a monopolist in the market for good α.
The extensive form game between the three firms is completely specified by the parameters c1 , c0 , a and so we shall denote it Γ(c0 , c1 , a). It is played as follows. For i ∈ {0, 1}
and j ∈ {1, 2}, put
qji ≡ quantity of good η outsourced by firm j to firm i
10

Our analysis thus suggests that the current widespread trend of outsourcing to offshore locations can well
persist for strategic reasons, even if offshore costs were to rise, so long as the offshore companies abstain from
the final product markets of their clients.
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i=0,1
(and put q ≡ {qji }j=1,2
). In the first stage of the game, firms 0 and 1 simultaneously and
publicly announce prices p0 and p1 at which they are ready to provide good η. Seeing
these prices, firm 2 then chooses q20 , q21 . Firm 1 observes q21 but not q20 , since q20 is part
of the secret contract between 0 and 2. Finally11 firm 1, also knowing the prices, decides
how much q11 to produce on its own and how much q10 to outsource to 0, making sure that
x1 (q) ≡ q11 + q10 − q21 ≥ 0 so that it is able to honor its commitment to supply q21 units of η
to 2. Denote x2 (q) ≡ q20 + q21 . Thus x1 (q) and x2 (q) are the outputs produced by 1 and 2 in
the market α.
It remains to describe the payoffs of the three firms at the terminal nodes of the game
tree. Any such node is specified by p ≡ (p0 , p1 ) and q = {qji }i=0,1
j=1,2 . The payoff to firm i is
Πi (p, q) where
Π0 (p, q) = p0 (q10 + q20 ) − c0 (q10 + q20 )

Π1 (p, q) = (a − x1 (q) − x2 (q))x1 (q) + p1 q21 − p0 q10 − c1 q11
Π2 (p, q) = (a − x1 (q) − x2 (q))x2 (q) − p0 q20 − p1 q21
This completes the description of the game Γ(c0 , c1 , a).

3

The Main Result

By an SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a), we shall mean a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies of the game Γ(c0 , c1 , a).
Our main result asserts that, if the the cost disadvantage of the outside firm 0 is not too
significant (i.e. c0 − c1 is not too large), then 2 will outsource good η to 0 in any SPNE.
Put
13
1
c∗ = c1 + a
14
14
and observe that (1) implies
a + c1
c1 < c∗ <
.
2
Our result is summarized in Figure 1 below, in which c0 is varied on the horizontal axis,
holding a and c1 fixed (and is even allowed to fall below c1 ).
Notice that the interval (c1 , c∗ ) is of particular interest because here firm 0 has a cost disadvantage compared to firm 1, yet 2 outsources η to 0 rather than from 1. Strategic considerations dominate firms’ behavior here. Below this interval, when c0 ≤ c1 , 0 has a cost
advantage over 1 and so 2 even more readily outsourced to 0; in fact, for small enough c0 ,
both 1 and 2 outsource to 0. We shall ignore this easy case where firm 0 becomes additionally attractive on account of its lower cost. To keep strategic incentives in the foreground,
we shall suppose throughout that c0 > c1 .
11

We could have supposed that firm 1 must place its order with 0 before finding out the quantity q21 . This
would alter the game somewhat but not our conclusion (Theorem 1 in Section 3 will hold without any change).
But the timing that we have given seems more natural to us. There is a fundamental asymmetry of information
between firms 1 and 2. Firm 1 always has the option of waiting to see how much q21 firm 2 will outsource to it
before approaching 0 to outsource its own q01 . In contrast, firm 2 can never know whether firm 1 has gone to 0
or not, so it cannot plan to wait until 1 has outsourced to 0 before placing its order with 1.
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Figure 1: The Outsourcing Pattern (j → i ≡ j outsources η exclusively to i)
For a precise statement of our result, define the function τ : [c1 , (a + c1 )/2] → R+ by
√
√
(3 − 2 2)(a + c1 ) 2 2p0
τ (p0 ) =
+
;
(2)
6
3
and, for any interval [u, v] ⊆ [c1 , (a + c1 )/2], define
(Graph τ )[u, v] ≡ {(p0 , τ (p0 ))|p0 ∈ [u, v]}
and abbreviate
Graph τ ≡ (Graph τ )[c1 , (a + c1 )/2]
Since τ (c1 ) > c1 and τ ((a + c1 )/2) = (a + c1 )/2, Graph τ is a straight line contained in
the square [c1 , (a + c1 )/2]2 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: (Graph τ )[u, v]
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem. (I) In any SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a), firm 1 never outsources to firm 0, i.e., q10 = 0.
8

(II) If c0 ∈ (c1 , c∗ ), there is a continuum of SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a), indexed by supplier prices
(p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c0 , c∗ ]; and, in every SPNE, firm 2 outsources η to the outside firm 0.
(III) If c0 ∈ (c∗ , (a + c1 )/2) , there is a continuum of SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a), indexed by
supplier prices (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c1 , c0 ]; and, in every SPNE, firm 2 outsources η to the
inside firm 1.
(IV) Finally, if c0 = c∗ , there are two SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a) with the same provider prices
(p0 , p1 ) = (c∗ , τ (c∗ )), but firm 2 outsources η to 0 in the first SPNE and to 1 in the second
SPNE.

4
4.1

Proof
Preparatory Lemmas

Throughout the lemmas below, c1 and a are fixed and (recall) c0 ∈ (c1 , (a + c1 )/2).
Lemma 1. In any SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a), we must have p0 ≥ c1 .
Proof. Suppose p0 < c1 . Since c1 < c0 (by assumption, see (1)), firm 0 makes (p1 −c0 ) < 0
dollars per unit of the total outsourced order q10 + q20 that it receives. If it could be shown
that q10 + q20 > 0, there would be an immediate contradiction, because firm 0 can in fact
ensure zero payoff by deviating from p0 to some sufficiently high p00 (any p00 higher than the
maximum price a in market α will do), at which price neither firm will outsource anything
to it.
To complete the proof, we now show that q10 + q20 > 0.
Let q20 = 0 (otherwise we are done). If 2 produces a positive amount, it must outsource
to 1, i.e., q21 > 0. Then, since p0 < c1 , 1 will pass on this order to 0, i.e., q10 > 0.
If 2 produces nothing then, as is easily verified, firm 1 will make a positive sale of α,
i.e., q10 + q11 > 0. But the cost of producing q10 + q11 is p0 q10 + c1 q11 . Since p0 < c1 , optimality
requires that q11 = 0, so we conclude that q10 > 0.
In view of Lemma 1, we will assume p0 ≥ c1 throughout the rest of this section.
Let G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) denote the subgame between 1 and 2, after (p0 , p1 ) and q21 are announced. In this subgame, 1 and 2 simultaneously choose (q10 , q11 ) and q20 , with q10 +q11 ≥ q21 .
Denote z ≡ q10 + q11 . If p0 > c1 then, in order to produce z, it is a strictly dominant strategy
for firm 1 to set q10 = 0 and q11 = z (i.e., to produce all of z at the lower cost c1 ); if p0 = c1 ,
then firm 1 is indifferent on the split of z. In either case, firm 1 procures η at cost c1 .
We may suppress η and think of G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) as a game involving only good α, in which
1 produces x1 ≡ z − q21 ≡ q10 + q11 − q21 at cost c1 and 2 produces q20 at cost p0 ; and in which
2 has an “endowment” q21 procured before entering the game at price p1 . The payoffs of 1
and 2 in G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) are given by
Π1 (x1 , q20 ) = (a − q21 − x1 − q20 )x1 − c1 x1 + (p1 − c1 )q21
Π2 (x1 , q20 ) = (a − q21 − x1 − q20 )(q21 + q20 ) − p0 q20 − p1 q21
9

(The terms (p1 −c1 )q21 and p1 q21 , involving good η, can be viewed as constants that are given
from the past, before the game G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) is played.)
Lemma 2. G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) has a unique NE.
Proof. Let (q1C (p0 ), q2C (p0 )) denote the quantities of firms 1 and 2 in the unique NE of the
Cournot game G(p0 , p1 , 0). As is well-known
½
(q1C (p0 ), q2C (p0 )) =

((a − 2c1 + p0 )/3, (a + c1 − 2p0 )/3) if p0 ≤ (a + c1 )/2
((a − c1 )/2, 0) if p0 ≥ (a + c1 )/2

(3)

Let [y]+ ≡ max{0, y} for any y ∈ R. It is easy to check that the NE of G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) is
unique and, indeed as follows.
(i) if 0 ≤ q21 ≤ [q2C (p0 )]+ , then 2 produces q2C (p0 ) − q21 and 1 produces q1C (p0 ) (as before);
(ii) if [q2C (p0 )]+ < q21 ≤ a − c1 , then 2 produces zero and 1 produces (a − c1 − q21 )/2;
(iii) if q21 > a − c1 , then both produce zero.
Lemma 3. Suppose p0 ≥ (a + c1 )/2. Then the NE of G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) is invariant of p0 . Hence
w.l.o.g. we may restrict p0 ≤ (a + c1 )/2.
Proof. If p0 ≥ (a + c1 )/2, then q2C (p0 ) = 0 by (3) and then (from (i), (ii), (iii) in the proof
of Lemma 2) q20 = 0. Since c1 < (a + c1 )/2, we have p0 > c1 and hence q10 = 0 as well.
So firm 0 receives no order from anyone when p0 ≥ (a + c1 )/2. The lemma follows.
We now move one step back in the game tree of Γ(c0 , c1 , a) and denote by G(p0 , p1 ) the
game that ensues after the simultaneous announcement of p0 and p1 . In looking for SPNE
of G(p0 , p1 ), it suffices to consider the problem in which firm 2 chooses q21 and then the
unique NE of G(p0 , p1 , q21 ) is played.
First imagine two games between firms 1 and 2 in the market α. In both games, the
inverse demand for α is fixed at P = max{0, a − Q} and the (constant, marginal) cost of
firm 1 (to produce α) is fixed at c1 . The constant marginal cost c ∈ [c1 , (a + c1 )/2] of firm
2 (to produce α) is considered variable and hence the game depends on c. Let S 21 (c) be
the Stackelberg duopoly with 2 as the leader and 1 the follower and let C(c) be the Cournot
duopoly between 1 and 2. These games have unique SPNE.12 Let f (c) and `(c) denote the
profits of 1 (follower) and 2 (leader) in the SPNE of S 21 (c). Let κ1 (c) and κ2 (c) denote the
corresponding profits in C(c). Finally, let q1S (c) and q2S (c) denote the output produced by 1
and 2 in the SPNE of S 21 (c) (and recall q1C (c) and q2C (c) are the corresponding outputs in
C(c)). It is well known that

(0, (a − c)/2) if c ≤ [2c1 − a]+ ,



(0, a − c1 ) if [2c1 − a]+ ≤ c ≤ [(3c1 − a)/2]+ ,
S
S
(q1 (c), q2 (c)) =
((a − 3c1 + 2c)/4, (a + c1 − 2c)/2) if [(3c1 − a)/2]+ ≤ c ≤ (a + c1 )/2,



((a − c1 )/2, 0) if c ≥ (a + c1 )/2.
(4)
12

In the Cournot game C(c), SPNE is just NE.
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Lemma 4 below characterizes the SPNE of G(p0 , p1 ) as (p0 , p1 ) varies. To state it, we
need to partition the price space [c1 , (a + c1 )/2] × [0, ∞) of (p0 , p1 ) into four regions RM ,
RS , RC and Graph τ (see Figure 3). Recall that [y]+ ≡ max{0, y} for any y ∈ R, and put
2
RM = {(p0 , p1 ) ∈ R+
|c1 ≤ p0 ≤ (a + c1 )/2, 0 ≤ p1 ≤ [(3c1 − a)/2]+ }
2
RS = {(p0 , p1 ) ∈ R+
|c1 ≤ p0 ≤ (a + c1 )/2, [(3c1 − a)/2]+ < p1 < τ (p0 )}
2
RC = {(p0 , p1 ) ∈ R+
|c1 ≤ p0 ≤ (a + c1 )/2, p1 > τ (p0 )}

Also, let us use the phrase “in SPNE” to mean “in the play induced by the SPNE”. We are
now ready to state Lemma 4.

Figure 3: SPNE of G(p0 , p1 )
Lemma 4. (Figure 3) Suppose p0 ≤ (a+c1 )/2. Let x1 (q) ≡ q10 +q11 −q21 and x2 (q) ≡ q20 +q21
be the quantities sold by firms 1 and 2 in the market α.
(i) In any SPNE of G(p0 , p1 ), q20 q21 = 0 and w.l.o.g. q10 = 0 (so that x1 (q) = q11 − q21 and
x2 (q) = max{q20 , q21 }).
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(ii) If (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RM , G(p0 , p1 ) has a unique SPNE with q20 = 0, x2 (q) = q21 > 0 and
x1 (q) = 0. Firms 0, 1, 2 have zero, negative, positive payoffs respectively and firm 2 is a
monopolist.
(iii) If (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RS , G(p0 , p1 ) has a unique SPNE in which q20 = 0 and the ensuing game
is S 21 (p1 ) where x2 (q) = q21 = q2S (p1 ) and x1 (q) = q1S (p1 ). Firms 0, 1 and 2 earn zero,
F (p1 ) ≡ f (p1 ) + (p1 − c1 )q2S (p1 ) and `(p1 ) respectively.
(iv) If (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RC , G(p0 , p1 ) has a unique SPNE in which q21 = 0 and the ensuing game
is C(p0 ) where x2 (q) = q20 = q2C (p0 ) and x1 (q) = q11 = q1C (p0 ). Firms 0, 1 and 2 earn
(p0 − c0 )q2C (p0 ), κ1 (p0 ) and κ2 (p0 ) respectively.
(v) If (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ, G(p0 , p1 ) has exactly two SPNE. In the first SPNE, q20 = 0
and the ensuing game is S 21 (p1 ) where x2 (q) = q21 = q2S (p1 ) and x1 (q) = q1S (p1 ); firms
0, 1 and 2 earn zero, F (p1 ) ≡ f (p1 ) + (p1 − c1 )q2S (p0 ) and `(p1 ) respectively. In the
second SPNE, q21 = 0 and the ensuing game is C(p0 ) where x1 (q) = q11 = q1C (p0 ) and
x2 (q) = q20 = q1C (p0 ); firms 0, 1 and 2 earn (p0 −c0 )q2C (p0 ), κ1 (p0 ) and κ2 (p0 ) respectively.
Proof. We first argue that w.l.o.g. q10 = 0. Recall p0 ≥ c1 . If p0 > c1 , it is obvious that
q10 = 0. If p0 = c1 , there is an irrelevant multiplicity of optimal choices for firm 1: it is
indifferent between all pairs (q10 , q11 ) such that q10 + q11 is a given constant z. But no matter
how 1 breaks the tie, this has no effect on the rest of the game, i.e., on the choice (q20 , q21 ) of
firm 2, or on the price of α, or on the payoffs of 1 and 2. Thus we may take13 q10 = 0 and
q11 = z.
The rest of the proof is again a matter of straightforward calculation. From (i), (ii), (iii)
in the proof of Lemma 2, we can compute the payoffs Πi (p0 , p1 , q21 ) at the terminal node of
the game Γ(c0 , c1 , a) that is reached by the unique NE of the subgame G(p0 , p1 , q21 ). (Note
that Π1 and Π2 include the sunk cost p1 q21 incurred by 2 and concomitant gain (p1 −c1 )q21 of
1, prior to reaching the node (p0 , p1 , q21 ) in Γ.) These are as follows (recalling the Cournot
quantities qiC (p0 ) from (3)).
 C
(q (p0 ))2 + (p0 − p1 )q21 if 0 ≤ q21 ≤ q2C (p0 )


 2
(a + c1 − 2p1 − q21 )q21 /2 if q2C (p0 ) < q21 ≤ a − c1
Π2 (p0 , p1 , q21 ) =
(a − q21 )q21 − p1 q21 if a − c1 < q21 < a



−p1 q21 if q21 ≥ a

(5)

 C
 (q1 (p0 ))2 + (p1 − c1 )q21 if 0 ≤ q21 ≤ q2C (p0 )
1
(a − c1 − q21 )2 /4 + (p1 − c1 )q21 if q2C (p0 ) < q21 ≤ a − c1
Π1 (p0 , p1 , q2 ) =

(p1 − c1 )q21 if q21 > a − c1

(6)

2
13
To be very formal, when p0 = c1 , the choices (q10 , q11 ) ∈ R+
of firm 1 may be partitioned into “equivalence
2
classes” Λ(z), z ∈ R+ , where Λ(z) = {(q10 , q11 ) ∈ R+
|q10 + q11 = z}. The game G(p0 , p1 ), and in particular
the set of its SPNE, is unaffected by which element firm 1 picks in Λ(z). In other words, when p0 = c1 , firm 1
may be viewed as choosing only z (and it is irrelevant which point in Λ(z) it actually picks to “effect” z).
Furthermore note that when we go a step back to the root of the tree Γ(c0 , c1 , a), it can in fact never happen
in any SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a) that p0 = c1 and that q10 > 0 (see Lemma 7).
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Next we move one step back in the game tree Γ and consider the maximization problem
faced by firm 2 at the start of the game G(p0 , p1 ). The set of its optimal choices is
β(p0 , p1 ) = arg max Π2 (p0 , p1 , q21 )
q21 ≥0

It can be verified, using (5), that
 S
 {q2 (p1 )} if p1 < τ (p0 )
{0, q2S (p1 )} if p1 = τ (p0 )
β(p0 , p1 ) =

{0} if p1 > τ (p0 )

(7)

The lemma follows from (i), (ii), (iii) (in the proof of Lemma 2) and (7).
Lemma 5. Suppose p1 ≥ (a + c1 )/2. Then the SPNE of G(p0 , p1 ) are invariant of p1 .
Hence w.l.o.g. we may restrict p1 ≤ (a + c1 )/2.
Proof. When p1 ≥ (a + c1 )/2, we are in the region RC . So q21 = 0 by (iv) of Lemma 4,
proving the result.
Let us recall (from Lemma 4) the payoff F (p1 ) of firm 1, when 1 is the follower in
S 21 (p1 ) and charges p1 to firm 2, i.e., F (p1 ) ≡ f (p1 ) + (p1 − c1 )q2S (p0 ).
Lemma 6. F is strictly increasing on [c1 , (a + c1 )/2].
Proof. Straightforward computation, using (4).
Lemma 7. In any SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a), the following hold:
(i) p1 > [(3c1 − a)/2]+
(ii) p0 < (a + c1 )/2
(iii) q20 + q21 > 0
(iv) if p0 < c0 , then q10 = q20 = 0.
(v) if q21 > 0, then (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c1 , c0 ].
Proof. (i) Suppose p1 ≤ [(3c1 − a)/2]+ . Then we are in the region RM and, by (ii) of
Lemma 4 (see Figure 3) q21 > 0. Since 0 < c1 < a (by (1)), we have [(3c1 − a)/2]+ < c1
and so p1 < c1 . Thus firm 1’s payoff is (p1 − c1 )q11 < 0. But 1 can deviate and set a
sufficiently high price (any price above a will do) to ensure that firm 2 does not outsource
to it, and thus 1 can earn a non-negative payoff, a contradiction.
(ii) By Lemma 3, we may suppose p0 ≤ (a+c1 )/2. So if the claim is false, p0 = (a+c1 )/2.
By Lemma 5 and (i) above, p1 ∈ ([(3c1 − a)/2]+ , (a + c1 )/2]. If p1 < (a + c1 )/2, then
(p0 , p1 ) ∈ RS and so, by (iii) of Lemma 4, firm 1 gets payoff F (p1 ). Since F is strictly
increasing, we must have p1 = (a + c1 )/2 (otherwise 1 can improve its payoff by increasing
p1 ). We conclude that p0 = p1 = (a + c1 )/2. Then (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ and, by (v) of
Lemma 4, there are two possible SPNE of G(p0 , p1 ). No matter which prevails, q20 = 0 (by
(3) and (4)) and hence firm 0 gets zero payoff. Let 0 deviate by changing p0 to p00 where
c0 < p00 < (a + c1 )/2. But (p00 , p1 ) ∈ RC and q20 > 0 (by Lemma 4 and (3)), so firm 0 earns
positive payoff as a result of the deviation, a contradiction.
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(iii) Denote I0 ≡ [c1 , (a + c1 )/2) and I1 ≡ ([(3c1 − a)/2]+ , (a + c1 )/2]. Then we have
(p0 , p1 ) ∈ I0 × I1 by Lemma 5 and (i) and (ii) above.
First consider p1 = (a + c1 )/2. Then (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RC for any p0 ∈ I0 and in any SPNE
of G(p0 , p1 ), we have q20 = q2C (p0 ) by Lemma 4. Since q2C (p0 ) > 0 for p0 ∈ I0 (by (3)), we
have q20 > 0.
Next consider p1 ∈ I1 \{(a + c1 )/2}. Then it follows from Lemma 4 that in any SPNE
of G(p0 , p1 ), q20 + q21 equals either q2C (p0 ) or q2S (p1 ). Since q2C p0 ) > 0 for p0 ∈ I0 (by (3))
and q2S (p1 ) > 0 for p1 ∈ I1 \{(a + c1 )/2} (by (4)), the result follows.
(iv) When p0 < c0 , firm 0 gets (p0 − c0 ) < 0 dollars for every unit that is outsourced to it. If
q10 + q20 > 0, then 0 gets negative payoff. But 0 can deviate and set a sufficiently high price
to ensure that no firm outsources to it and 0 can thus guarantee zero payoff, a contradiction.
(v) By (i) and (ii) above and by Lemma 5, c1 ≤ p0 < (a + c1 )/2 and [(3c1 − a)/2]+ <
p1 ≤ (a + c1 )/2. But then, by Lemma 4, q21 > 0 implies (p0 , p1 ) ∈ [RS ∪ Graph τ ]. If
(p0 , p1 ) ∈ RS , i.e., p1 < τ (p0 ), then (again by Lemma 4) firm 1 earns F (p1 ). Since F is
strictly increasing (by Lemma 6), 1 can improve its payoff by raising its price to p1 + ε <
τ (p0 ), a contradiction. This proves (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ.
It remains to show that p0 ≤ c0 . Suppose p0 > c0 . Then since c0 > c1 by assumption,
we have p0 > c1 which immediately implies that q10 = 0. Since q21 > 0, we also have
q20 = 0 by (i) of Lemma 4. So firm 0 gets no order and earns zero payoff. Let firm 0
reduce p0 to p0 − ε > c0 . Since (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ as shown in the previous paragraph,
(p0 − ε, p1 ) ∈ RC (see Figure 3) and so firm 2 will outsource a positive amount to 0 after
0’s deviation (by Lemma 4 and (3)). Thus 0 earns a positive payoff after its deviation, a
contradiction.
Recall the Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly games, S 21 (c) and C(c) in which the cost
of firm 1 is fixed at c1 while that of its rival firm 2 is a variable c. The function κ1 (c)
simply gives the standard Cournot profit of firm 1. In contrast, F (c) = f (c) + (c − c1 )q2S (c)
lumps together the profit f (c) that 1 makes as the follower in S 21 (c) as well as the revenue
(c − c1 )q2S (c) that 1 earns by supplying 2 its Stackelberg-leader output q2S (c) at price c.
The following lemma compares F and κ1 . First define
c̃ = 55c1 /62 + 7a/62

(8)

and observe that c1 < c̃ < (a + c1 )/2 by (1).
Lemma 8. (Figure 4) κ1 is strictly increasing on [c1 , (a + c1 )/2]. Moreover, F < κ1 on
[c1 , c̃), F > κ1 on (c̃, (a + c1 )/2), F (c̃) = κ1 (c̃) and F ((a + c1 )/2) = κ1 ((a + c1 )/2).
Proof. Straightforward computation using the explicit formulae for κ1 and F that follow
from (3) and (4).
For any c, we shall define λ(c) to be the minimum cost of firm 2 at which 1 is willing to
switch from the Cournot game C(c) to being follower in the Stackelberg game S 21 (λ(c)).
Precisely
λ : [0, c̃] → [0, c̃]
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Figure 4: The Functions κ1 and F
is given by
λ ≡ F −1 ◦ κ1 .
The function λ is well-defined, strictly increasing and λ(c̃) = c̃.
Lemma 9. (Figure 5) Let c ∈ [c1 , c̃]. Then κ1 (c) = F (λ(c)), F (y) < κ1 (c2 ) for y < λ(c)
and F (y) > κ1 (c) for y > λ(c).
Proof. The proof follows from lemmas 6, 8 and the definition of λ.

Figure 5: The Function λ
The next lemma compares the functions τ and λ. Define
c∗ = 13c1 /14 + a/14

(9)

c1 < c∗ < c̃.

(10)

and observe from (1) and (8) that
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Lemma 10. (Figure 6) Let c ∈ [c1 , c̃]. Then λ(c∗ ) = τ (c∗ ), τ (c) < λ(c) for c ∈ [c1 , c∗ ),
τ (c) > λ(c) for c2 ∈ (c∗ , c̃].
Proof. Straightforward computation using the explicit formula for τ in (2) and the explicit
formulae for κ1 and F that follow from (3) and (4).

Figure 6: τ (p0 ) and λ(p0 )
Lemma 11. (p0 − c0 )q2C (p0 ) is increasing in p0 for p0 ∈ [c1 , c̃].
Proof. A simple calculation shows that (p0 − c0 )q2C (p0 ) = (p0 − c0 )(a + c1 − 2p0 )/3 for
p0 ∈ [c1 , (a + c1 )/2] from which the result follows.
Lemma 12. In any SPNE of Γ(c0 , c1 , a), if q20 > 0, then (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graphτ )[c1 , c∗ ].
Proof. In step 1 we show that p0 ∈ [c1 , c∗ ] and in step 2 we show that p1 = τ (p0 ).
Step 1: By Lemma 1, we have p0 ≥ c1 . So it suffices to show that p0 ≤ c∗ .
Since q20 > 0 we have, by (iv) and (v) of Lemma 4, that (p0 , p1 ) ∈ [RC ∪ Graph τ ] and
that the payoff of firm 1 is κ1 (p0 ). In what follows, we show that if p0 > c∗ , firm 1 can earn
more than κ1 (p0 ) by setting a price p01 < τ (p0 ), a contradiction establishing step 1.
Recall from (10) that c1 < c∗ < c̃. First suppose that c̃ ≤ p0 < (a + c1 )/2. By (ii) of
Lemma 7, we must have p0 < (a + c1 )/2. Let firm 1 change p1 to p01 ≡ τ (p0 ) − ε > 0.
Then (p0 , p01 ) ∈ RS and, by (iii) of Lemma 4, 1’s payoff is F (p01 ). Since τ (p0 ) > p0 for
p0 < (a + c1 )/2, we have p01 > p0 for small enough ε, implying that F (p01 ) > F (p0 )
(since F is strictly increasing—see Lemma 6). Since p0 ≥ c̃, it follows from Lemma 8 that
F (p0 ) ≥ κ1 (p0 ). Hence F (p01 ) > κ1 (p0 ), showing that firm 1 has made a gainful deviation,
a contradiction. So we must have p0 < c̃.
Now suppose that c∗ < p0 < c̃. Then λ(p0 ) < τ (p0 ) by Lemma 10. Let firm 1
change p1 to p01 ≡ λ(p0 ) + ε where ε is small enough to ensure that λ(p0 ) + ε < τ (p0 ).
Then (p0 , p01 ) ∈ RS and 1 gets the payoff F (p01 ) (by (iii) of Lemma 4). Since F is strictly
increasing, F (p01 ) > F (λ(p0 )). By the definition of λ, we have F (λ(p0 )) = κ1 (p0 ). Hence
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F (p01 ) > κ1 (p0 ), showing that firm 1 has made a gainful deviation, a contradiction. This
proves that p0 ∈ [c1 , c∗ ].
Step 2: Since q20 > 0, we must have (p0 , p1 ) ∈ [RC ∪ Graph τ ] and the payoff of firm 0 is
(p0 − c0 )q2C (p0 ) (by (iv) and (v) of Lemma 4).
By Lemma 5, we may suppose that p1 ≤ (a + c1 )/2. We have already shown that
p0 ∈ [c1 , c∗ ]. Since c∗ < (a + c1 )/2, we have τ (p0 ) < (a + c1 )/2. If (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RC , then
p1 ∈ (τ (p0 ), (a+c1 )/2]. Let 0 deviate and set a price p00 ≡ p0 +ε < c̃ where ε is sufficiently
small to ensure that p00 < c̃ and p1 > τ (p00 ). Then (p00 , p1 ) ∈ RC and firm 0 will earn
(p00 − c0 )q2C (p00 ) after the deviation. Then by Lemma 11, it follows that (p00 − c0 )q2C (p00 ) >
(p0 − c0 )q2C (p0 ). This shows that when (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RC , firm 0 can make a gainful deviation.
Hence we must have (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ which, together with p0 ∈ [c1 , c∗ ], proves that
(p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c1 , c∗ ].

4.2

Proof of the Theorem

Proof of (I) This has been proved as (i) of Lemma 4 and (iv) if Lemma 7.
Proof of (II) Consider c0 < c∗ . First we show that q21 = 0 in any SPNE. For if q21 > 0, we
must have (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c1 , c0 ] by (v) of Lemma 7. Then p1 = τ (p0 ) < (a + c1 )/2
and, by (v) of Lemma 4, firm 1 gets payoff F (p1 ) = F (τ (p0 )). Let 1 deviate and choose
p01 ∈ (τ (p0 ), (a+c1 )/2]. Then (p0 , p01 ) ∈ RC and, by (iv) of Lemma 4, 1 gets payoff κ1 (p0 ).
Since p0 ≤ c0 < c∗ , Lemma 10 implies that τ (p0 ) < λ(p0 ). By the strict monotonicity of
F (Lemma 6), it follows that F (τ (p0 )) < F (λ(p0 )). By the definition of λ, F (λ(p0 )) =
κ1 (p0 ). Since F (p1 ) = F (τ (p0 )), we conclude that κ1 (p0 ) > F (p1 ), showing that firm 1
has improved after the deviation, a contradiction.
By (iii) of Lemma 7, q20 + q21 > 0. We have just shown that q21 = 0. Hence we must have
q20 > 0 in any SPNE. Then it follows from Lemma 12 that (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c1 , c∗ ] in
any SPNE. By (iv) of Lemma 7, we must have p0 ≥ c0 . Since c0 < c∗ , the interval [c0 , c∗ ]
is non-empty, hence (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c0 , c∗ ].
q20

It remains to show that for any (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c0 , c∗ ] we do get an SPNE with
> 0.

First consider firm 2. Since (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ we see (by (v) of Lemma 4) that firm 2
has exactly two optimal choices, which involve exclusive orders from either 0 or 1. Since it
is already choosing the former, it cannot profit by a unilateral deviation.
Next consider firm 0. Its payoff is (p0 − c0 )q2C (p0 ), which is non-negative since p0 ≥ c0 .
But (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ , i.e., p1 = τ (p0 ). If 0 reduces its price from p0 to p00 < c1 , then
(since c1 < c0 ), 0 gets at most zero payoff. If 0 reduces its price from p0 to p00 ≥ c1 ,
then τ (p00 ) < τ (p0 ) = p1 . So (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RC implying (by (iv) of Lemma 4) that 0 will get
(p00 − c0 )q2C (p00 ). Observe that (p00 − c0 )q2C (p00 ) < (p0 − c0 )q2C (p0 ) (by Lemma 11 and the
fact that c∗ < c̃), so again the deviation is not gainful. If 0 increases its price from p0 to p00 ,
then τ (p00 ) > τ (p0 ) = p1 and (p0 , p1 ) ∈ RS . Then, by (iii) of Lemma 4, 0 gets zero payoff,
again gaining nothing.
Finally consider firm 1. Its payoff is κ1 (p0 ). Recall that p1 = τ (p0 ). If 1 raises its price
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to p01 > p1 = τ (p0 ), then (p0 , p01 ) ∈ RC and, by (iv) of Lemma 4, 1 will still get κ1 (p0 ).
If 1 lowers its price to p01 < p1 = τ (p0 ), then (p0 , p01 ) ∈ RS and, by (iii) of Lemma 4,
1 will get F (p01 ). By the strict monotonicity of F , we have F (p01 ) < F (p1 ) = F (τ (p0 )).
Since p0 ≤ c∗ , we have τ (p0 ) ≤ λ(p0 ) (Lemma 10), so that F (τ (p0 )) ≤ F (λ(p0 )). By the
definition of λ, F (λ(p0 )) = κ1 (p0 ). Hence we conclude that F (p01 ) < κ1 (p0 ), showing that
1 cannot improve by any unilateral deviation. This completes the proof of part (II).
Proof of (III) Consider c∗ < c0 < (a + c1 )/2. If q20 > 0, then (a) p0 ≥ c0 (by (iv) of
Lemma 7) and (b) p0 ≤ c∗ (by Lemma 12). Since c∗ < c0 , both (a) and (b) cannot hold. So
we must have q20 = 0. Since q20 + q21 > 0 (by (iii) of Lemma 7), we conclude that q21 > 0.
Then, by (v) of Lemma 7, it follows that (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c1 , c0 ].
It remains to show that for any (p0 , p1 ) ∈ (Graph τ )[c1 , c0 ] we do get an SPNE with
q20 > 0.
First consider firm 2. We can argue exactly as in the proof of (I) that it cannot make a
gainful unilateral deviation.
Next consider firm 0. Its payoff is zero. Since p0 ∈ [c1 , c0 ], by lowering its price to
p00 < p0 ≤ c0 , it can get at most zero payoff. Since (p0 , p1 ) ∈ Graph τ , p1 = τ (p0 ). If 0 it
raises its price to p00 > p0 , then τ (p00 ) > τ (p0 ) = p1 . Hence (p00 , p1 ) ∈ RS and, by (iii) of
Lemma 4, 0 continues to get zero payoff.
Finally consider firm 1. Its payoff is F (p1 ) = F (τ (p0 )). If 1 lowers its price to p01 <
p1 = τ (p0 ), then (p0 , p01 ) ∈ RS and, by (iii) of Lemma 4, 1 gets F (p01 ). By the monotonicity
of F , F (p01 ) < F (p1 ) and so 1 does not profit. If 1 raises its price to p01 > p1 = τ (p0 ), then
(p0 , p01 ) ∈ RC and, by (iv) of Lemma 4, 1 gets κ1 (p0 ). Consider two cases. If p0 ≥ c̃, we
have F (p0 ) ≥ κ1 (p0 ) by Lemma 8. Since p0 < (a + c1 )/2, we have τ (p0 ) > p0 (see Figure
2) so that F (τ (p0 )) > F (p0 ). Hence F (τ (p0 )) > κ1 (p0 ), so 1 does not gain. If p0 < c̃,
we have τ (p0 ) > λ(p0 ) by Lemma 10, so F (τ (p0 )) > F (λ(p0 )). By the definition of λ,
F (λ(p0 )) = κ1 (p0 ) and we have F (τ (p0 )) > κ1 (p0 ), so once again 1 does not gain. This
completes the proof of part (III).
Proof of (IV). The argument is as in parts (II) and (III), hence omitted.

5

Variations of the model

Our model can be varied in many ways, but the essential theme remains intact: if O’s costs
are not much higher than I’s, J will outsource to O. The overall analysis follows the outline
of the proof of Theorem 1, but the details can get more complicated, and we omit them here.

5.1

Economies of scale

Keeping the rest of the model fixed as before, now suppose that there are increasing, instead
of constant, returns to scale in the manufacture of the intermediate good η, i.e., the average
cost ci (q) of manufacturing q units of η falls (as q rises) for both i = 0, 1. For simplicity,
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suppose ci (q) falls linearly and that c0 (q) = λc1 (q) for some positive scalar14 λ. It can then
be shown that there exists a threshold λ∗ > 1 such that if λ < λ∗ :
(i) firm 2 outsources to firm 0 in any SPNE,
(ii) both firms 1 and 2 outsource to firm 0 in any SPNE when economies of scale are not too
small.
This result is established in Chen and Dubey (2005). (We already gave the intuition for it in
the introduction.)15

5.2 Multiple firms of each type
Suppose there are n0 , n1 , n2 replicas of firms 0, 1, 2. The timing of moves is assumed to be
as before, with the understanding that all replicas of a firm move simultaneously wherever
that firm had moved in the original game. Restricting attention to type-symmetric SPNE,
Theorem 1 again remains intact with a lower threshold.

5.3

Only Outside Suppliers

The strategic incentives that we have analyzed can arise in other contexts. Suppose, for instance, that 1 and 2 both need to outsource the supply of the intermediate good η to outsiders
O = {O1 , O2 , . . .}. If 2 goes first to O and 1 knows which Oi has received 2’s order, then
1 will have incentive to outsource to some Oj that is distinct from Oi , even if Oj ’s costs are
higher than Oi ’s, so long as they are not much higher. For if 1 went to Oi , it might have
to infer the size of 2’s orders and thus be obliged to become a Stackelberg follower (e.g.,
because Oi has limited capacity and can attend to 1’s order only after fully servicing the
prior order of 2). Alternatively, even if 1 does not know who 2 has outsourced to, or indeed
if 2 has outsourced at all, it may be safer for 1 to spread its order among several firms in O
so that it minimizes the probability of becoming 2’s follower. We leave the precise modeling
and analysis of such situations for future research.

6

The Secrecy Clause

It is crucial to our analysis that the quantity outsourced by 2 to 0 cannot be observed by
1. This is not an unrealistic assumption. Many contracts, in practice, do incorporate a
confidentiality or secrecy clause (see, e.g., Ravenhill, 2003; Clarkslegal and Kochhar, 2005).
But the secrecy clause can often be deduced to hold endogenously in equilibrium (in
appropriately “enlarged” games).
14

Thus c1 (q) = max{0, c − bq} and c0 (q) = λ max{0, c − bq} for positive scalars b, c, λ.
It is needed here that the economies of scale be not too pronounced, otherwise pure strategy SPNE may fail
to exist. More precisely, for the average cost function c1 (q) =max{0, c − bq}, it is assumed that 0 < b < c/2a
to guarantee (i) the existence of pure strategy SPNE and (ii) in equilibrium, the quantity produced entails positive
marginal cost.
15
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Indeed suppose that the quantity q outsourced by 2 to 0 can be made “public” (and hence
observable by 1) or else kept “secret” between 2 and 0. We argue that a public contract
can never occur (be active) at an SPNE, as long as the game provides sufficient “strategic
freedom” to its various players. For suppose it did occur : 1 knew that 2 buys q units of
η from 0 at price p0 . Thus 1 is a Stackelberg follower in the final market α, regardless of
whom 2 chooses to outsource η to. It would be better for 1 to quote a lower price p0 −ε for η.
This would be certain to lure 2 to outsource to 1. But p0 ≥ c0 , since 0 could not be making
losses at the presumed SPNE; hence p0 − ε > c1 for small enough ε (recall c0 > c1 ). By
manoeuvering 2’s order to itself, firm 1 thus earns a significant profit on the manufacture of
η. It does lose a little on the market for α, because 2 has a lower cost p0 − ε of η (compared
to the p0 earlier), but the loss is of the order of ε. Thus 1 has made a profitable unilateral
deviation, contradicting that we were at an SPNE.
Note that our argument relies on the fact that 1 has the strategic freedom to “counter”
the public contract. If, furthermore, 0 also has the freedom to reject the public contract and
counter it with a secret contract, then—foreseeing the above deviation by firm 1—firm 0
will only opt for secret contracts.
The most simple instance of such an enlarged game is obtained by inserting an initial
binary move by 0 at the start of our game Γ. This represents a declaration by 0 as to whether
its offer to 2 is by way of a public or a secret contract. The game Γ follows 0’s declaration.
It is easy to verify that any SPNE of the enlarged game must have 0 choosing “secret”,
followed by an SPNE of Γ. Of course, more complicated enlarged games can be thought of.
For example, after the simultaneous announcement of p0 and p1 in our game Γ, suppose firm
2 has the option to choose “Public q” or ”Secret q” in the event that it goes to 0, followed by
“Accept” or “Reject” by 0. Clearly 1 finds out q only if “Public q” and “Accept” are chosen.
On the other hand, if 0 chooses “Reject” we (still having to complete the definition of the
enlarged game) could suppose that 2’s order of η is automatically directed to 1. This game
is more complex to analyze, but our argument above still applies and shows that a public
contract will never be played out in any SPNE.
We thus see that the secrecy clause can often emerge endogenously from strategic considerations, even though—for simplicity—we postulated it in our model. It has been pointed
out already by Clarkslegal and Kochhar that the firm placing orders (firm 2 in our model)
may demand secrecy in order to protect sensitive information from leaking out to its rivals
and destroying its competitive advantage. Our analysis reveals that the firm taking the orders (i.e., firm 0) may also—for more subtle strategic reasons—have a vested interest in
maintaining the secrecy clause.
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